Translating and Analysing ‘Lost’ Arabic Medieval Manuscripts

Background

I was researching about niche thinkers from the Islamic Golden Age and was surprised to find that some of their writings, despite existing in some PDF deep on the internet, had not been translated to English in the modern era. In fact, no translation existed at all for any person in the 21st century. Perhaps a translation into Latin or Greek might have happened historically, but often copies of those do not survive and if they did probably haven’t made their way onto the internet. For these less prominent thinkers, there seems to be enough corpus knowledge to say ‘this person wrote about this idea’, but without any modern academic having actually engaged directly with the original writings. 

I was thinking about translating these myself which seemed like a fun idea at first. But it’s a rather foolish idea when I think about it: my Arabic isn’t good enough to do any justice to the complexity of the topics and sophistication of the language. Even if it was, I do not have the time nor focus of a medieval monk translator. Having me painfully go through these manuscripts sentence by sentence was never going to be a scalable solution that produced anything of interest to the world. Top tier AI models to the rescue. Instead of human translation, in a brief summary, I have used Google OCR to extract the text, output a JSON file which I then convert into text to be translated by GPT-5.2. I do checks myself manually and also embedded into the AI prompts to ensure that the text has been both extracted accurately and that the translation is coherent and representative. As for the style of translation, the emphasis is on preserving the technical sense of the wording rather than trying to represent it in more modern parlance. This leaves the English texts below as relatively inaccesible and ambiguous; that is a price worth paying to read the text in the technical spirit with which it was written.

Some of the original PDFs are hundreds of pages long. Dumping hundreds of pages of dense, philosophical work in translated English, isn’t of much use to anyone. As is often the case, quality beats quantity. I have instead focused on select extracts that I believe to be of the most interest. Using my own research I then manually write (not AI generated) a brief piece that contextualises who the writer was, and how their thoughts compare to both contemporary western and Islamic thinkers, and also present day science. 

Why do I do this? To increase the richness and variety of human knowledge. It should be exciting to bring back ideas from brilliant minds in history into the modern world that has otherwise been lost to the sands of time. 

Translations:

Al-Matalib Al-Alia (1210 AD) - Fakhr al-Din al-Razi

——————

Theories on Atomism and the Multiverse: Extracts from Al-Matalib Al-Alia (1210 AD): pp. 13-27
Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, full name: Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar ibn al-Ḥusayn bin Ali al-Razi al-Tabaristani

-start of translation-

On the Interpretation of Origination (ḥudūth)

We say: there is no doubt that the originated thing (al-muḥdath) cannot be interpreted except as that which is preceded by something other than itself. That preceding thing is either non-existence or existence. If it is non-existence, then it is said that the originated thing is that whose existence is preceded by non-existence. If that preceding thing is existence, then it is said that the originated thing is that which is preceded by the existence of another thing.

The first interpretation is preferable, because the originated thing, insofar as it is originated, must have its existence preceded by its non-existence; but it does not follow, insofar as it is originated, that its existence must be preceded by the existence of something else. For unless it is proven by evidence that the originated thing cannot occur except through an originator that already exists, it is not established that the originated thing must be preceded by the existence of something else. Rather, whether we say that the originated thing originates by itself, or by another, or neither by itself nor by another, it must necessarily be preceded by non-existence. Thus it is established that interpreting the originated thing as that which must be preceded by non-existence is preferable to interpreting it as that which must be preceded by something else.

Once this is understood, we say: you have already learned in the book Aḥkām al-Mawjūdāt that precedence and priority are of five kinds:

(1) precedence by causality,

(2) precedence by essence,

(3) precedence by nobility,

(4) precedence by place,

(5) precedence by time.

Given this, we say: if what is meant by non-existence preceding existence is precedence by causality, this is impossible, because non-existence cannot be a cause of existence. If what is meant is precedence by essence, this is conceded. For the world, according to us, is possible, and the possible has from its own essence only non-entitlement, while from something other than itself it has the establishment of entitlement. That which it has from its essence is prior to what it has from another, by precedence of essence.

As for precedence by nobility or by place, their impossibility is evident. What remains is precedence by time. We say: precedence by time does not occur except with the occurrence of time. If the non-existence of the world precedes its existence with a precedence that has no beginning, and it is established that this precedence is nothing other than temporal, and it is established that temporal precedence does not occur except with the existence of time, then this entails the eternity of time. It has further been established in natural philosophy that time is an accident of motion, and motion is an accident of body; thus the eternity of time entails the eternity of body. Hence it is established that interpreting the origination of bodies in the way you mentioned necessitates affirming the eternity of bodies. Therefore, the interpretation you mentioned is false, this, if you interpret the originated thing as that whose existence is preceded by non-existence.

However, if you interpret the originated thing as that which is preceded by the existence of something else, we say: if you mean precedence by causality, by essence, or by nobility, all of that is conceded. For according to us the world is possible in itself and necessary through the necessity of its cause; thus that cause is prior to the world by causality, by essence, and by nobility. As for precedence by place, it is invalid by consensus; and even if it were granted, it would not contradict the eternity of the world, because it is not impossible in the first consideration of reason that there exist something above this world in place, co-existing eternally with the world.

What remains is temporal precedence, and thus the same argument returns: since it is prior to the world in time, and its precedence over the world is without beginning, it follows that time has no beginning – leading again to an impossibility.

This objection is answered by saying: we establish that the non-existence of a thing may precede its existence by a sixth kind of precedence, distinct from these five kinds.

The existence of this sixth kind is indicated by several arguments.

First Argument

Time is something that exists only through the succession of its parts and the contiguity of its segments. If one part perishes, then the part that occurs after it is either necessary in itself or not. The first is false, because what is necessary in itself is that whose quiddity is not susceptible to non-existence, whereas this part which now occurs after having been non-existent was susceptible to non-existence; thus it cannot be necessary in itself. Since this is false, it must be possible in itself. And everything that is possible in itself does not entail impossibility from the mere supposition of its non-existence.

So let us suppose that the first part of time perishes and no other part of time occurs after it. Then non-existence occurs after existence, and this “after-ness” is not temporal, because we have supposed the absolute non-existence of time. Thus precedence and posteriority have occurred without consideration of time. Once this is intelligible, it is likewise intelligible that precedence and posteriority occur between the existence of the originated thing and its non-existence without time. And this is the required conclusion.

Second Argument

There is no doubt that time consists of contiguous divisions and successive parts. We say: each one of those parts occurs after its non-existence, and everything that is such is possible in itself. Therefore, each part of time is possible in itself. And whatever has all of its parts possible in themselves, its totality is also possible in itself.

It follows that the totality of time is possible in itself. And every possible-in-itself thing has an agent; therefore, the totality of time has an agent. That agent is either necessitating or choosing. The first is false, for otherwise the effect would endure as long as the essence of the cause endures, and it would follow that time is existent, fixed in essence, and free from change and succession; and whatever is like that is not time. Thus, if the agent of time were necessitating by essence, time would not be time, which is impossible.

Hence it is established that the agent of time is a voluntary agent. A voluntary agent must precede its act. It follows that the agent of time precedes the existence of time. This precedence is not temporal, for otherwise time would exist at the moment of its own non-existence, which is impossible. Thus this is a type of precedence distinct from temporal precedence and from the other mentioned kinds. This is the required conclusion.

Third Argument

Time is either originated or eternal. If it is originated, its non-existence precedes its existence, and that precedence is not temporal; thus the precedence of non-existence over existence has occurred without time. If it is eternal, then its continuance is not by time, otherwise time would require another time. And if the continuance of a thing can be understood without time, then why should its origination not also be understood without time?

Fourth Argument

There is no doubt that yesterday precedes today. The precedence of yesterday over today is not by causality. This is shown in two ways. First, the parts of time are similar; if one part were the cause of another, the latter would be the cause of the former, and each would be the cause of itself – since things equal in quiddity must be equal in their concomitants. Second, a cause must be present when its effect is present; so if the first part of time were the cause of the second, both would have to occur simultaneously, in which case time would not be time. This is absurd.

By this same reasoning it is also established that the precedence of some parts of time over others cannot be by essence, nobility, or place. It remains that it be by time. But this too is impossible, because temporal precedence means that the prior exists in a time in which the posterior does not, and then another time occurs in which the posterior exists. If some parts of time were temporally prior to others, each part of time would exist in another time, such that one would be the container and vessel of the other. The same discussion would then apply to the parts of that container, leading to an infinite regress in which every time exists in another time, and all of them exist simultaneously – which is false for two reasons.

First, it would entail that this present hour is not one hour but infinitely many hours, which is rejected by the immediacy of reason.
Second, the totality of infinitely many past days would precede the totality of present days, and the container must be other than the contained. Thus that which is the container of the totality must be outside the totality; yet it must also not be outside it, since an individual of a thing must be included within its totality. This would entail that one and the same thing is both inside and outside the same totality, which is impossible. Thus this proof establishes that the precedence of some parts of time over others is a sixth kind, distinct from the five kinds. And once this is understood, the same should be understood regarding the precedence of the non-existence of the originated thing over its existence.

Fifth Argument

The explicit judgment of reason rules that for any two things to which reason points, one must either be prior to the other, or concomitant with it, or posterior to it. Being outside these three divisions is inconceivable and rejected by the immediacy of reason. Given this, the Creator and the world must fall under one of these three divisions. If precedence, concomitance, and posteriority occur only by time, and we have shown that the divine essence is free from these three states, then the divine essence would require something other than itself in some of its concomitants. And whatever requires another in its existence is possible in itself. This would entail that what is necessary in itself is possible in itself, which is impossible. Thus it is established that precedence, concomitance, and posteriority do not depend on time at all. And this is the required conclusion.

Sixth Argument

Even if precedence, concomitance, and posteriority are not intelligible except by time, there is no doubt that whatever occurs in a given time is present in that time, and its being concomitant with time is not due to another time. Thus we have understood concomitance without time. And once that is understood, why should precedence and posteriority not also be understood without time? These are the totality of the investigations in this matter.

An explanation of the various positions held on this question

Know that this sensible corporeal world undoubtedly exists with specific attributes. The body is the matter, and those attributes are the form. We say the world is either:

Originated with respect to both its matter and its form,
Eternal with respect to both its matter and its form,
Eternal with respect to its matter and originated with respect to its form,
Originated with respect to its matter and eternal with respect to its form,
Or one suspends judgment regarding these divisions.

These are the possible divisions in this topic:

First Division

That the world is originated in both its matter and its form. This is the position of most adherents of religions and sects among Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Magians.

Second Division

That the world is eternal in both its matter and its form. This is the doctrine of Aristotle and his followers among the ancients and the later philosophers, including Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī and Abū ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā.

The details of this doctrine are as follows. Bodies are either celestial or elemental.

Celestial bodies are eternal without beginning or end in their essences and in all their attributes, and they move with a single continuous motion from eternity to eternity without rest at all.

As for elemental bodies, their matters persist eternally, but their forms are subject to rest and corruption. Every form is preceded by another form, without a first. They further say that all bodies, whether celestial or elemental, are possible in themselves and necessary due to the necessity of their cause; hence the perpetuity of the cause entails the perpetuity of the effect.

Third Division

That the world is eternal in matter and originated in form. This discussion depends on identifying the first matter.

The overwhelming majority of scholars say that the first matter is body, a substrate receptive to different attributes. They then differ:

Some say that bodies are identical in their complete quiddity and reality, differing only by attributes inhering in them. Others say that the body of fire differs in quiddity from the body of earth, such that the heat of fire is identical with its specific essence, and the coldness of earth is identical with its specific essence.

View of those who hold bodily quiddities to be identical

They disagreed about the attributes of heat, coldness, moisture, and dryness.

Some said these attributes consist in bodies occurring in specific geometrical shapes. The shape of earth is that which is enclosed by six squares – the cube. When a body has this shape, it cannot penetrate other bodies; this is density and earthliness.

The shape of fire is that which is enclosed by four equal triangles. When it has this shape, it penetrates other bodies by its point, and penetration entails the separation of the continuity of the penetrated body – this is burning and dispersal. Thus every body whose shape is cubic is dense and is earth; and every body whose shape is the aforementioned shape penetrates others and separates their parts, thus becoming burning and consuming, namely fire.

Every body enclosed by eight triangles is quick to flip from face to face – this is air. Every body enclosed by twenty triangles is water. According to this doctrine, fire-ness, water-ness, air-ness, and earth-ness consist in the acquisition of these specific shapes.

Others rejected this and claimed that these four qualities – heat, coldness, moisture, and dryness – are accidents additional to and distinct from the shapes. This is the stronger view.

Further elaboration:

Those who say the first matter is body and that bodies are identical in complete quiddity have two opinions.

First opinion: bodies existed eternally, devoid of all attributes, and attributes later occurred in them. On this view there are two further possibilities:
All bodies were one continuous body which gradually separated; this is suggested by the divine statement: “Have those who disbelieve not seen that the heavens and the earth were joined together, then We split them apart?”
The parts were distinct and separate.
On the second, there are again two possibilities:
The parts were separate and at rest from eternity until eternity, then were moved and mixed, producing the world. The opening of the Torah suggests this, where it says the world came into being because the Spirit of God moved over the darkness.
The parts were eternally in motion. This is the doctrine of Democritus, who held that sensible bodies are composed of indivisible parts, divisible only in imagination, not in actual existence. Each part is spherical, because simple nature yields only a shape with equal sides, namely the sphere. The void is also homogeneous, so there is no reason for any part to remain in one place rather than another; thus each must move by its own nature eternally. During these motions the parts collided and compacted, forming rotating structures – this rotation is the heaven. Parts near the concave of the heaven became intensely hot (fire); those farthest from it, at the center, became extremely cold and dense (earth); between them arose air and water. Thus the four elements arose, then mixed through celestial motions, producing the three kingdoms (minerals, plants, animals).

Second opinion: bodies were eternally qualified by some of these qualities and are thus subject to generation and corruption. Because their essences are equal, whatever applies to one may apply to another, fire can become earth and vice versa.
They then differed about which element is primary: earth, fire, vapor, water, or air, each with a process of rarefaction and condensation producing the others. These views are mutually conflicting, and each is merely possible in itself
View that bodies differ in quiddity:
Here it is said that the corporeality of fire is a specific corporeality necessitating heat by its essence, and likewise for water and coldness. On this account, generation and corruption are impossible in the elements themselves; rather, the four elements existed eternally and mixed to form the world.
Among them, some say only the four primary qualities are essential, while others say even complex qualities (bread-ness, meat-ness, sweetness, etc.) are essential but hidden due to extreme mixture. These are the proponents of the doctrine of infinite mixture.
Those who deny that first matter is body. They hold that the first matter is something in which corporeality occurs.
Hylomorphism: body is composed of prime matter and form. Corporeality is not self-subsistent but occurs in a substrate devoid of extension and position. This is the view of al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Plato, and Aristotle. Some say this substrate exists. Others say it is nonexistent (those who claim the nonexistent is a thing).
Qualitative generation: bodies arise from heat, cold, moisture, and dryness, which exist eternally.
Dualism: the world’s matter is light and darkness, both eternal.
Pythagorean view: the first matter is units. Everything requires unity to exist; unity itself is independent. Unity becomes a point, two points a line, two lines a surface, two surfaces a body; then geometrical solids generate the elements. Thus unity is the first matter of the corporeal world.

Remaining Divisions:

Fourth Division: that the world is eternal in attributes but originated in essences—is necessarily false.

Fifth Division: ‘suspension of judgment’ is attributed to Galen, who reportedly said on his deathbed that he did not know whether the world is originated or eternal, nor whether the soul is temperament or something else. Some take this as blameworthy, but we say it proves his intellectual fairness, because the difficulty of this question overwhelms most minds.

God knows best.

-end of translation-

Analysis

Al-Razi’s work here is clearly heavily influenced by his Ash’ari belief with regard to atomism. He explicitly refers to Democritus’ theory of ‘indivisible parts’ which are then subject to forces of collision and compacting, although unlike Democritus Al-Razi does not have a mechanistic view of this process, and instead belongs to his Ash’arite view on occasionalism.

Al-Razi’s views straddle the Falsafa School and the Kalam method of thinking. He is someone who had been trained in falsafa early on and had his works adopt its conceptual framework: necessity vs possibility, cosmology, essence vs existence. Is it after this that he adopts conclusions equivalent to Kalam-Ash’ari views. A Mu’tazilite would agree with these rational views of the cosmos but would disagree on the basis of this: for they would think that God acts out of rational necessity - a necessity that Al-Razi claims does not exist within his framework of divine freedom.

Al Razi’s views on both atomism and the cosmos are clearly at odds with Avicennan falsafa. Ibn Sina stated that the cosmos is necessarily single, while for Al Razi it was contingent. Ibn Sina also rejected atomism and instead saw essence as a continuum rather than something discretionary and indivisble.

Al Razi is not crucial to atomism. He is not as foundational a thinker in the area as Mu’tazilites who mostly came earlier like Abu al-Hudhayl. Where he does have an important role, coming later in the Islamic Golden Age, is synthesising earlier modes of thinking into a more philosophical version of Kalam.

The obvious western contemporary in both their respective fields of thought and time of writing would be Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas did allow for the concept of a plurality of worlds, but rejected atomism. Aquinas himself asserted there was one world but that there is no proof nor reason why God could not have created more than one. This logic has strong similarities with the Kalam view. However, he rejected any discrete model for matter and thought of it as purely continuous.

As for similarities to modern science, Al-Razi cannot claim credit for contributing to the atomic theory or cosmology of today. His work is fundamentally grounded in theology and philosophy, not the mechanistic world view that flourished in the Enlightenment. This is certainly the case for atomic theory, which we now know is divisible and something between continuous and discrete based on probabilistic excitations. As for the possibility of many worlds, Al-Razi’s work is more relevant here as philosophy has contributions to make in an area that is harder to test scientifically. Unlike Everett branches which state that many worlds are a necessary outcome with no choice involved, Al-Razi is merely stating that divine choice and power allows for different worlds with different laws. Both agree that we cannot assume nor proof that our metaphysical existence is unique.